

## NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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IN RE: :  
 :  
THE EL FARO INCIDENT OFF THE: NTSB Accident No.  
COAST OF THE BAHAMAS ON : DCA16MM001  
OCTOBER 1, 2015 :  
 :  
-----:

INTERVIEW OF: OS2 [REDACTED]

Tuesday,  
October 13, 2015

USCG Seventh District Command Center  
Miami, Florida

## BEFORE:

JON FURUKAWA, NTSB  
DENNIS BRYSON, ABS  
PATTY FINSTERBUSCH, TOTE Services  
PAUL WEBB, U.S. Coast Guard

## PRESENT ON BEHALF OF THE INTERVIEWEE:

CDR [REDACTED] U.S. Coast Guard JAG Corps

This transcript was produced from audio provided by  
the National Transportation Safety Board.

TABLE OF CORRECTIONS TO TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW FOR

[REDACTED]

TAKEN ON

Oct 13 2015

PAGE NUMBER	LINE NUMBER	CURRENT WORDING	CORRECTED WORDING	
17	12/13	AUTOMATED MUTUAL VESSEL ASSISTANCE	AUTOMATED MUTUAL VESSEL EMERGENCY RESPONSE	AMVER
17	14	SOLUS	SOLAS (SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA)	
19	9	A LEE	A LEE (LEEWAY NAUTICAL TERM)	
25	9	PROPER SECTOR	PROPER RCC (RESCUE COORDINATION CENTER)	
27	17	SARSAT	SARSAT (SEARCH & RESCUE SATELLITE)	
44	10	MSL	MISLE (MARITIME INFO SYSTEM FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT)	
SEVERAL	SEVERAL	MSL	SAME AS ABOVE	
77	4	STATEMENT TAKEN IN MIAMI FL	IT READS JACKSONVILLE, FL,	

If, to the best of your knowledge, no corrections are needed kindly circle the statement "no corrections needed" and initial in the space provided.

NO CORRECTIONS NEEDED.

                      
Initials

[REDACTED]  
Printed Name of Person providing the above information

[REDACTED]

                      
Signature of Person providing the above information

NOV 12 2015  
Date

1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

2 (11:52 a.m.)

3 MR. FURUKAWA: It is October 13, 2015, a  
4 Tuesday. It is 1152. We are at the U.S. Coast Guard  
5 District 7 Command Center interviewing Operations  
6 Specialist Second Class [REDACTED]

7 This is John Furukawa from the NTSB and  
8 Petty Officer [REDACTED] do you know that you are being,  
9 this interview is being taped with your consent?

10 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

11 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. Why don't we go around  
12 the room and introduce ourselves and who we represent  
13 for the transcriber. It's John Furukawa, NTSB, and I  
14 am the Chairman of the Survival Factors Group.

15 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: Patricia Finsterbusch,  
16 TOTE Services, member of the Survival Group.

17 MR. BRYSON: Dennis Bryson, American Bureau  
18 of Shipping, member of the Survival Group.

19 MR. WEBB: Paul Webb, U.S. Coast Guard D-17,  
20 Survival Group.

21 MR. [REDACTED] Commander [REDACTED] Coast  
22 Guard JAG, representative of the witness.

23 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. And I've already got  
24 your name down here, so, Petty Officer [REDACTED] why  
25 don't you, your name, your job title, and -- Yes, name

1 and job title to start off.

2 MR. [REDACTED] Sure. My name is [REDACTED]  
3 [REDACTED] and my job title for this case is Operations  
4 Unit Controller or OU for District 7.

5 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. And, let's see, is it  
6 okay I call you [REDACTED]

7 MR. [REDACTED] That's fine.

8 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay, [REDACTED] why don't you  
9 tell me your background, you know, how old you are, how  
10 long you've been in the Coast Guard, you know, your  
11 experience with the Coast Guard.

12 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. I am 35 years old. I  
13 have been in the Coast Guard for about 12 years. I did  
14 three years on the Coast Guard Cutter Seneca and I  
15 spent four years at Coast Guard Sector Jacksonville  
16 prior to getting here.

17 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. And what did you do in  
18 Jacksonville?

19 MR. [REDACTED] I was an SU, or a situation  
20 unit controller and a CU, which is a communications  
21 unit controller.

22 MR. FURUKAWA: Doing pretty much the same  
23 stuff that you are doing here?

24 MR. [REDACTED] No. I do operations unit  
25 controller here.

1 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. Was it a SAR kind of a  
2 station in Jacksonville or is it --

3 MR. [REDACTED] It is, but I didn't do search  
4 and rescue in Jacksonville.

5 MR. WEBB: And, [REDACTED] explain then what a CU  
6 is and --

7 MR. [REDACTED] So communications unit is the  
8 radiomen, the person that hails out to people on the  
9 radio and keeps communications with them.

10 The situations unit controller I did more of  
11 all the other missions that the Coast Guard handles  
12 other than search and rescue.

13 I did a lot of marine environmental  
14 protection, a lot of pollution, marine investigations,  
15 and handled protecting high-value assets that would  
16 enter and leave port.

17 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. Okay, and on the  
18 cutter what were duties onboard the ship?

19 MR. [REDACTED] So I did basically OS's on  
20 ships, do radio and CIC, radar, and that type of thing,  
21 without getting into an area that we don't want to get  
22 into.

23 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. And how long have you  
24 been here in Miami with this, your present duty  
25 assignment?

1 MR. [REDACTED] I've been here a little over  
2 a year.

3 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. And does anybody else  
4 want to add any, ask any background questions?

5 MR. BRYSON: Is the -- I'm sorry, Dennis  
6 Bryson. Is this the, is Miami the only unit you have  
7 been the operation unit controller?

8 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

9 MR. FURUKAWA: Anything else?

10 MR. BRYSON: No, that's all.

11 MR. FURUKAWA: Paul?

12 MR. WEBB: No, not yet.

13 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. Let's see. Okay, so  
14 we've already gone over your position with the Coast  
15 Guard as the OU. Do you only stand OU watches here?

16 MR. [REDACTED] No.

17 MR. FURUKAWA: You stand --

18 MR. [REDACTED] I stand OU and SU, situation  
19 unit as well.

20 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. But you're a permanent  
21 watchstander, that's your primary duty?

22 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

23 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. Can you pretty much  
24 describe what you are responsible for SU? What are  
25 your responsibilities for OU?

1 MR. [REDACTED] Direct oversight for all of  
2 the sector cases within D-7. So from Charleston all  
3 the way down to Key West as well as St. Petersburg.

4 So I provide oversight and policy to the  
5 sectors and I review their cases as well as operations  
6 unit, mission execution, search and rescue planning for  
7 search and rescue cases that D-7 has a SAR mission  
8 coordinator of. I am the direct representative of the  
9 SAR mission coordinator.

10 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. And we're, you know,  
11 our job here is to listen to you because, you know,  
12 you're the, basically the first person in D-7 to get  
13 contact with the shipping company, okay, so we'd like  
14 to, you know, find out about that.

15 MR. [REDACTED] Okay.

16 MR. FURUKAWA: So for October 1st, which was  
17 a Friday, let's see, what time did you arrive at work?

18 MR. [REDACTED] 0530 is when I usually get  
19 here. I can't tell you specific that day, but around  
20 0530.

21 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. And your watch starts  
22 at 0600?

23 MR. [REDACTED] Six, yes.

24 MR. FURUKAWA: Turn two, okay. And you were  
25 scheduled to work from 0600 to 1800, correct, 12-hour

1 watches?

2 MR. [REDACTED] Correct.

3 MR. FURUKAWA: And what time did you work  
4 till that day?

5 MR. [REDACTED] I don't recall when I  
6 actually left.

7 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. But it was after --

8 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

9 MR. WEBB: You worked greater than 12 hours?

10 MR. [REDACTED] I don't know. I wasn't on  
11 watch greater than 12 hours.

12 MR. WEBB: Yes, but I mean --

13 (Simultaneous speaking)

14 MR. [REDACTED] I may have been in the  
15 building and doing pass down and everything else. I  
16 honestly don't remember if I was here longer than -- I  
17 mean I definitely was here longer than 12 hours that  
18 day because I got here 30 minutes prior.

19 With pass down and watch relief I would've  
20 stayed at least 30 minutes after, but I don't remember  
21 specifically what time I left the building that day.

22 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. And you were on watch  
23 as the OU, the operations unit?

24 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

25 MR. FURUKAWA: Do you know who relieved you



1 that day?

2 MR. [REDACTED] I'd have to look at the  
3 schedule, I believe it was Petty Officer [REDACTED].

4 MR. WEBB: [REDACTED]?

5 MR. [REDACTED] Yes, [REDACTED], [REDACTED] is  
6 his first name.

7 MR. WEBB: The first name was what?

8 MR. [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

9 MR. WEBB: [REDACTED]

10 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

11 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay, so pass, [REDACTED]  
12 relieved you, probably on time-ish?

13 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

14 MR. FURUKAWA: It's a requirement for his  
15 1800 watch?

16 MR. [REDACTED] Correct.

17 MR. FURUKAWA: But then you stated you think  
18 you stayed later to do some admin towards the, about  
19 the hurricane or --

20 MR. [REDACTED] Well, no. I mean the pass  
21 down starts at 6:00, so I mean I would've stayed until  
22 the conclusion of that pass down, which generally takes  
23 30 to 45 minutes.

24 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. Thirty to 45 minutes  
25 pass down normally?

1 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

2 MR. FURUKAWA: So you might not have been  
3 done with your watch really until almost 1900, 1830,  
4 1845?

5 MR. [REDACTED] Well, I'd say that was a fair  
6 assessment.

7 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. And do you think you  
8 stayed past the watch or did you go home?

9 MR. [REDACTED] No, I went home.

10 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. Were there any other  
11 emergencies that were being handled when you were,  
12 around 0700 on the 1st?

13 MR. [REDACTED] Define emergencies.

14 MR. FURUKAWA: Well any other SAR acts. As  
15 the OU, the operations unit, you are doing SAR stuff,  
16 right?

17 MR. [REDACTED] Yes. Did I have any other  
18 active search and rescue cases happening at the same  
19 time?

20 MR. FURUKAWA: Correct.

21 MR. [REDACTED] I believe I did. I'd have to  
22 go back and, you know, I could find out specifics for  
23 you, but, yes.

24 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. Do you remember how  
25 many?

1 MR. [REDACTED] No, I don't.

2 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay.

3 MR. [REDACTED] It's an easy answer to find  
4 out. I could go back and look at the OPSUM and see  
5 what was going on, but I don't know right now just off  
6 the top of my head.

7 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. Can you describe the  
8 conversation between yourself and Captain John  
9 Lawrence, he was the TOTE designated person ashore --

10 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

11 MR. FURUKAWA: -- on October 1st, and like  
12 who called who and then what you recollect the  
13 conversation was?

14 MR. [REDACTED] Sure. When I called him I  
15 had gotten an email from my counterparts at LANTAREA  
16 describing the situation and I called John Lawrence  
17 because I wanted to get in touch with the actual vessel  
18 and I wanted to try and find out more information and  
19 see what type of information he had.

20 Because the only information that we had at  
21 that time and the only person that had actually spoken  
22 with the ship was John, and that was what was reported  
23 to me.

24 And the situation was that the ship had  
25 taken on some water, became disabled, had a 15 degree

1 list. They had since secured that and were de-watering  
2 the vessel and if I recall in the initial report that  
3 was made that the ship was in no danger of sinking.

4 I called John and spoke briefly and I wanted  
5 to know what the company was doing as far as, you know,  
6 commercial salvage or commercial assistance because I  
7 advised John at that time that the Coast Guard does not  
8 have anything that would be capable of towing or  
9 providing any type of assistance other than removing  
10 the 33 people on board, and that was my initial  
11 conversations.

12 I also wanted John to keep calling the ship,  
13 as I was going to do, to see if we could any type of  
14 communications established. There was still a lot of  
15 questions that I wanted answered that we couldn't  
16 because nobody got communications with the ship.

17 I believe John was the last one to talk to  
18 the El Faro. D-7 never had any direct communications  
19 with the boat, with the El Faro.

20 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. You said that you got  
21 an email from LANT?

22 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

23 MR. FURUKAWA: I guess you're going have to  
24 get that email, too, but do you remember what, you  
25 know, what was communicated in that email?

1 MR. [REDACTED] Sure. It was a Inmarsat C  
2 distress alert along with a SAS alert and then  
3 everything I previously stated, that, you know, that  
4 they had taken on water, that they were listing, that  
5 they were without power, that they were de-watering.

6 It also provided the ship's position in that  
7 email and that's it.

8 MR. [REDACTED] Is that email confidential?

9 MR. [REDACTED] It is not.

10 MR. [REDACTED] Do you have it available?

11 MR. [REDACTED] I could go print it out and -

12 -

13 MR. [REDACTED] Is that something that you are  
14 interested in?

15 MR. FURUKAWA: Yes.

16 MR. [REDACTED] All right. All right, why don't  
17 we just --

18 MR. FURUKAWA: Pause it.

19 MR. [REDACTED] -- take five minutes here and  
20 you can go get that email.

21 MR. [REDACTED] Sure. Yes, let me go print  
22 it out.

23 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay, it's 12:07, I'm going  
24 to pause the interview with Petty Officer [REDACTED]

25 [REDACTED]

1 (End of audio file

2 130212\_ [REDACTED] and start of audio  
3 file 130212\_ [REDACTED]

4 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay, we're back on tape. It  
5 is still Tuesday the 13th of October 2015. It is now  
6 12:31 in the afternoon. And I made a mistake, I had  
7 stopped the interview, but this is a continuation of  
8 the interview with Operations Specialist Second Class

9 [REDACTED]  
10 We paused the interview so he could go up  
11 and print out an email that came from LANTAREA to  
12 District 7 concerning the El Faro and do you want to  
13 ask questions?

14 MR. WEBB: Yes, this is Paul Webb. The  
15 question, you got the Inmarsat C, SASS (phonetic), and  
16 do you know if there was an HFDSC alert that was  
17 received anywhere?

18 MR. [REDACTED] None that were reported to  
19 me, no.

20 MR. WEBB: Okay.

21 MR. FURUKAWA: And can you explain the  
22 acronyms?

23 MR. WEBB: HFDSC, DSC is digital selective  
24 calling. There is different areas, a close to shore,  
25 Area 1, is VHF and there's a little button on a VHF

1 radio. Also, do you know if there was any VHF?

2 MR. [REDACTED] There were not any VHFDC  
3 either.

4 MR. WEBB: Okay. VHF is close to shore out  
5 to about 25 to 50 miles and then there is an, there was  
6 an Area 2, which was MF, but the Coast Guard doesn't  
7 monitor that anymore.

8 And there is HF, which is Area 3, which goes  
9 offshore and that's what the El Faro would've, if they  
10 used the HFDSC function that's what they would have  
11 used.

12 Can I continue with a couple questions to  
13 kind of just backfill --

14 MR. FURUKAWA: For the email or --

15 MR. WEBB: No, no, no.

16 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. Let me get finished  
17 with these questions here.

18 MR. WEBB: Okay.

19 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. So did we already ask  
20 you if, or what the information was on the email?

21 MR. [REDACTED] Yes. Yes, you have.

22 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

23 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. And, let's see, it  
24 looks like Commander [REDACTED] (phonetic) gave you a call  
25 and you discussed what was on there?

1 MR. [REDACTED] Well he gave me a call and  
2 said I'm going to be forwarding you an email soon with,  
3 you know, with everything.

4 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. So not much was said  
5 on the phone, it's all in the email, kind of --

6 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

7 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. Were you familiar with  
8 the weather status in the area relative to the ship's  
9 position and what was the weather status at the time  
10 the call was received?

11 MR. [REDACTED] Sure. Not until I plotted  
12 the position of the ship, obviously, you know, the ship  
13 was transiting in the Bahamas, yes, I was aware of the  
14 weather in the area.

15 I had forecasted weather, but it wasn't  
16 until I talked to the motor vessel Emerald Express did  
17 I get a good weather report from somebody that was not  
18 on scene, but near scene.

19 I believe they were 50 miles away on the  
20 other side of the Acklins and Crooked Islands trying to  
21 get away from the storm and they were reporting very  
22 severe weather.

23 I don't remember exactly what they were  
24 reporting, but it was consistent with hurricane  
25 weather.



1 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. By the other side of  
2 the Crooked Islands, it's south?

3 MR. [REDACTED] Well, so the Acklins and  
4 Crookeds kind of go like this and he was sitting here.

5 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. And the ship was, the  
6 El Faro --

7 MR. [REDACTED] And the ship was --

8 MR. FURUKAWA: To the north of that?

9 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

10 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. So we have kind of a  
11 barrier between (inaudible) storm, the Emerald Express?

12 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

13 MR. FURUKAWA: And what were -- Did you call  
14 out to the Emerald Express or --

15 MR. [REDACTED] So one of the first things  
16 that I did is I tried to pull an AMVER SURPIC which  
17 would tell us if there was any AMVER vessels in the  
18 area and I had to go out to 150 miles to find any other  
19 vessels that were in the area.

20 Since that didn't work I had to go, I went  
21 to the CG-1 view, which is our AIS feed which shows a  
22 live feed of all the, what should be all the ship  
23 tracks out there, and I found the Emerald Express on  
24 the other side of the Island on that feed and then  
25 contacted them directly via SAT phone.

1 I also requested that they issue call outs  
2 to try and establish communications with the vessel and  
3 call me back if they were able to establish  
4 communications.

5 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. Okay, let's see. Can  
6 you explain the acronym AMVER? You said you pulled  
7 the, something, AMVER's pic?

8 MR. WEBB: It was the AMVER SURPIC.

9 MR. [REDACTED] Yes, the AMVER SURPIC.

10 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay, can you explain the  
11 acronyms?

12 MR. [REDACTED] Yes. It's the Automated  
13 Mutual Vessel Assistance. It's basically to -- There  
14 is other solus class ships, other big ships that are  
15 able to provide assistance to mariners in far and  
16 remote spaces where the Coast Guard might not have any  
17 assets available to provide a timely response.

18 So in cases, you know, in foreign countries  
19 and, you know, far off from the United States where we  
20 become aware of a situation that's one of our, you  
21 know, highly sought after and highly used resources  
22 because there could be an AMVER ship that's close by  
23 willing to provide assistance.

24 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. And the acronym, you  
25 used a CG-1 view?

1 MR. [REDACTED] CG-1 view, it's just a, it's  
2 an internal Coast Guard program and it has --

3 MR. WEBB: That's what they showed you --

4 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay.

5 MR. [REDACTED] Yes, we showed you that  
6 earlier. It's got the commercially available AIS  
7 feeds, long-range satellite-based AIS so you can track  
8 ships that have transponders.

9 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay.

10 MR. [REDACTED] AIS stands for?

11 MR. WEBB: Automated Information System.

12 MR. [REDACTED] I think -- Yes.

13 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay, Automated Information  
14 System?

15 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

16 MR. FURUKAWA: Or identification --

17 MR. WEBB: Identification System, I'm sorry.

18 MR. [REDACTED] I think it's identification.

19 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay.

20 MR. WEBB: I'll get it right.

21 MR. FURUKAWA: And what did the Emerald  
22 Express tell you about the weather?

23 MR. [REDACTED] I'd have to look at the DVL  
24 to say exactly, but I --

25 MR. FURUKAWA: What's DVL?

1 MR. [REDACTED] The phone conversations.

2 MR. WEBB: Data Voice --

3 MR. FURUKAWA: Oh. Data Voice Logbook?

4 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

5 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay.

6 MR. [REDACTED] But I believe he was  
7 reporting 20 to 30-foot seas and 50 plus knot winds. I  
8 don't remember specifically what he was saying, and  
9 that was, you know, with alee on the island where he  
10 was reporting that.

11 I don't remember exactly the weather that he  
12 reported, that's why I said consistent with, you know,  
13 with hurricane conditions.

14 And then due to all of those factors,  
15 receiving the EPIRB alert, receiving the Inmarsat C,  
16 receiving the, you know, everything else and still not  
17 being able to establish communications or get into  
18 contact with the ship we were in the distress phase.

19 Minutes after I got that email I briefed my  
20 SAR mission coordinator, who was in the office, on the  
21 case and what we had and when we were in the distress  
22 phase I started making preparations to see if we could  
23 launch any type of asset to go render assistance to the  
24 El Faro.

25 The closest asset that would've been

1 available to respond is the Air Station Clearwater  
2 Forward Deployed MH-60 out of Great Inagua. That would  
3 have been the closest asset.

4 I did call them through OPBAT, which is  
5 Operation Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos, it's a command  
6 center, and they work directly for us. It's basically  
7 our in-country hub that's manned 24/7 by Coast Guard  
8 and they liaise with the government of the Bahamas, in  
9 this case on our behalf.

10 I had them contact the pilots there and see,  
11 based on the weather reports see if it was even  
12 remotely possible to send a helicopter out there to  
13 effect a rescue and I was told that it was not.

14 Based on the weather conditions they were  
15 out of limitations. The Coast Guard cutters that would  
16 have been available were hundreds of miles away.

17 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay.

18 MR. [REDACTED] Everybody was avoiding this  
19 storm. Now when I did plot the position that was  
20 received off of that email it was right in the center  
21 of the hurricane off of that email.

22 MR. FURUKAWA: The position of the vessel  
23 was right in the center?

24 MR. [REDACTED] Correct. That's why we  
25 couldn't get anything out there immediately and that's

1       what hampered the efforts.

2                   MR. FURUKAWA:   So you're plotting it on your  
3       computer screen?

4                   MR. [REDACTED]    Yes.

5                   MR. FURUKAWA:   Okay.   Do you know how big  
6       the wall of the hurricane was or how big the eye of the  
7       center was at the time?

8                   MR. [REDACTED]    No, I don't.

9                   MR. FURUKAWA:   Okay.   But it was pretty  
10      close to the center?

11                  MR. [REDACTED]    Yes.

12                  MR. FURUKAWA:   Okay.

13                  MR. [REDACTED]    Yes, sir.

14                  MR. FURUKAWA:   You said the Air Station  
15      Clearwater (inaudible) at Great Inagua?

16                  MR. [REDACTED]    Yes, correct.

17                  MR. FURUKAWA:   And that's OPBAT?   What's  
18      OPBAT?

19                  MR. [REDACTED]    Operation Bahamas, Turks, and  
20      Caicos.

21                  MR. FURUKAWA:   Operation Bahamas, Turks, and  
22      what?

23                  MR. [REDACTED]    Caicos.

24                  MR. FURUKAWA:   Caicos, okay.

25                  MR. WEBB:   They have weird names of those

1 little islands.

2 MR. [REDACTED] Yes, Turks and Caicos is an  
3 island that's south of that, it's owned by the British,  
4 and then, obviously, the Bahamas.

5 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. Let's see. Does  
6 anybody want to ask a question about this subject?

7 MR. [REDACTED] And just for the record the  
8 printout of the EPIRB, this is Commander [REDACTED] the  
9 printout of the EPIRB notification came in. I provided  
10 that to Paul Webb for inspection.

11 MR. FURUKAWA: Thank you.

12 MR. [REDACTED] Also on that, the EPIRB never  
13 provided a position. It was a, it's called a first  
14 alert unlocated and you won't see it on there but it  
15 closed out due to time 18 hours later. That EPIRB  
16 never provided a position.

17 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: This is Patty  
18 Finsterbusch from TOTE Services. Is that in fact the  
19 El Faro's EPIRB?

20 MR. WEBB: Take a look.

21 MR. [REDACTED] It is.

22 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: Okay. Is the one on/off  
23 sound that we heard, or that was heard, that --

24 MR. WEBB: Yes.

25 MR. [REDACTED] I don't know. I can't talk

1 to that.

2 MR. WEBB: A follow-on question on that,  
3 this is Paul Webb. In your experience with an  
4 unlocated 406 what would be some of the reasons why you  
5 would only get one hit on an EPIRB and then not get the  
6 LEO updates to get a position?

7 Was it something that you guys, I know you  
8 discuss in training and everything, so, and this is an  
9 opinion, this would be an opinion of yours, what would  
10 you think would cause that, because that also goes into  
11 your mindset on the case?

12 MR. [REDACTED] Yes. Okay, so you are asking  
13 me for my opinion?

14 MR. WEBB: Yes.

15 MR. [REDACTED] Go ahead and answer it if you  
16 know.

17 MR. [REDACTED] In my opinion it could be  
18 caused by any number of things. The master could have  
19 activated it and then deactivated it. It could've  
20 activated and then sunk and then it wouldn't have ever  
21 provided a position either because they have to float  
22 on the water.

23 Most of the solus class ships basically  
24 carried -- They can be activated by two ways. They can  
25 be manually activated by a switch or they can be water



1 activated by hydrostatic release.

2 Also, in my opinion, you could have gotten  
3 some type of interference that caused the beacon not to  
4 locate because the vessel was under a Category 4  
5 hurricane.

6 Because they are satellite-based, so  
7 generally they need a clear link between the actual  
8 beacon and the satellite that it's talking to. So if  
9 it was very quick on/off or it couldn't establish a  
10 connection with the satellite or if it was subsurface.

11 And, again, that's just my opinion of some  
12 possible outcomes on why that did not provide a  
13 location.

14 MR. [REDACTED] This is Commander [REDACTED] To  
15 clarify the opinion, have you seen unlocated EPIRBs in  
16 the past in your experience?

17 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

18 MR. [REDACTED] Is it typical that an EPIRB will  
19 first ping as an unlocated signal?

20 MR. [REDACTED] Generally they all do.

21 MR. [REDACTED] And then in your experience that  
22 you would expect a follow-up EPIRB signal?

23 MR. [REDACTED] Correct.

24 MR. [REDACTED] Did you ever get a follow-up  
25 EPIRB signal in this case?

1 MR. [REDACTED] No, we did not.

2 MR. BRYSON: This is Dennis Bryson. If they  
3 moved the EPIRB selector to test and it sends off that  
4 do you get the one ping, right, the set --

5 MR. [REDACTED] We do not receive the test  
6 signal. If they test the beacon properly we receive  
7 the emergency signal and that goes up through USMCC, or  
8 United States Mission Control Center, and then it'll  
9 get directed down to the proper sector.

10 Because this vessel is home ported out of  
11 Jacksonville, Florida, the unlocated alert, that's how  
12 it got routed to us, because their home port is within  
13 our search and rescue region.

14 MR. BRYSON: Is the USMCC, the Mission  
15 Control Center, is that the same thing as LANTAREA?

16 MR. WEBB: No.

17 MR. [REDACTED] No. It's completely  
18 different.

19 MR. WEBB: That's a NOAA function.

20 MR. BRYSON: Okay.

21 MR. WEBB: And they are located in Suitland,  
22 Maryland. So if you need to go talk to them you can go  
23 to Suitland. I can get you the proper person to talk  
24 to.

25 MR. BRYSON: Okay. But this is something

1 automated?

2 MR. WEBB: There is a Mission Control Center  
3 in Suitland. The system is automated but there is  
4 people that monitor it and there is experts there that  
5 can explain a lot of that stuff.

6 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

7 MR. BRYSON: Okay.

8 MR. WEBB: So it's something that, you know,  
9 we definitely want to definitely look into.

10 MR. [REDACTED] And I think they would be in  
11 a lot better position to answer, you know, as far as  
12 providing professional opinions on, you know, an  
13 unlocated EPIRB or whatever, because that's what they  
14 do, that's specifically what they do.

15 MR. BRYSON: Okay. But the first ping is  
16 always unlocated?

17 MR. [REDACTED] Not always.

18 MR. WEBB: It's another -- Let me explain it  
19 again. I'll give my name again, Paul Webb. The reason  
20 why they are unlocated is when they get activated,  
21 whether it's from the hydrostatic release or it's taken  
22 off, nobody has to turn a switch on and off, okay, it's  
23 automatic.

24 So they take it off the bulk head, the  
25 signal immediately goes up, the light starts flashing,

1 the signal goes up, and then that signal, it's a data  
2 burst, it's a very quick data burst and that data burst  
3 has a hexadecimal code and that's what the satellite  
4 gets and then this hexadecimal code is what gets  
5 transmitted down to USMCC through these local  
6 transmission units that are around the country.

7 MR. [REDACTED] The Lutz (phonetic).

8 MR. WEBB: The Lutz. And they have a  
9 footprint, the satellite has a footprint and one of the  
10 Lutz will pick up the signal. So they get the signal,  
11 that hacks that code, then goes to the processing  
12 center at Suitland, Maryland, and nobody touches this  
13 stuff, it's all automatic.

14 That system takes it and it says okay, hex  
15 code, this information registered in Jacksonville, SRR  
16 is D-7 and D-7, it gets transmitted to D-7 and it comes  
17 across their SARSAC computer, they get the alert.

18 It has all the information with the  
19 exception of the position because the satellite that  
20 picked up the signal is the geostationary satellite.  
21 It doesn't have the ability to doppler.

22 You have to wait until the low earth  
23 orbiting satellites come around, due to doppler shift,  
24 and that's how they get the position.

25 MR. BRYSON: Okay.

1 MR. WEBB: The only way you get a position  
2 on the initial unlocated is --

3 MR. [REDACTED] E solution.

4 MR. WEBB: -- if it's got a GPS-enabled  
5 system. Either it's through a remote to the GPS at a  
6 ship where there is a GPS onboard the unit itself.

7 MR. BRYSON: Okay.

8 MR. [REDACTED] And when we do receive that  
9 that's called an E solution.

10 MR. WEBB: Right. If it has a GPS  
11 (inaudible) E solution, yes.

12 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

13 MR. BRYSON: Okay. But they don't  
14 automatically start activating when you remove them  
15 from the breadth (phonetic). I mean unless --

16 MR. WEBB: Yes, they do.

17 MR. BRYSON: No, they don't. I mean I've  
18 taken them out many times. I mean there's a pin in  
19 there. Now it's water activated, if the vessel sinks,  
20 right, and the hyper release then it pulls --

21 MR. WEBB: Right, that's (inaudible). If  
22 you pull it off the bracket it activates.

23 MR. BRYSON: No, because when you take them  
24 out of the bracket to go to the lifeboat, right, you  
25 know, if you do a drill and a lot of times people do

1 drills and they take them out of the bracket and they  
2 bring it down to the lifeboat it doesn't activate it.

3 MR. [REDACTED] The different manufactures do  
4 things differently.

5 MR. WEBB: Yes, 98 percent false alarm  
6 (inaudible).

7 MR. [REDACTED] Like different manufacturers.

8 MR. BRYSON: But I mean it doesn't  
9 automatically activate every time you take it out of  
10 the bracket as long as the arming is secure. And there  
11 are different types of EPIRBs.

12 MR. WEBB: Right.

13 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

14 MR. BRYSON: Okay. Again, we'll go --

15 MR. [REDACTED] I think different  
16 manufactures would have --

17 MR. WEBB: And that's something that we can  
18 go to, especially with this one, we can go back to NOAA  
19 and to the manufacturer (inaudible).

20 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

21 (Off the record comments)

22 MR. [REDACTED] It has the brand on there,  
23 too.

24 MR. WEBB: Yes, it's a (inaudible).

25 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

1 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. Okay, what steps were  
2 taken after the phone call with, let's see, with the  
3 phone call with Captain Lawrence?

4 MR. [REDACTED] Are you talking Mr. Lawrence,  
5 John Lawrence?

6 MR. FURUKAWA: Right, John Lawrence, yes,  
7 Mr. Lawrence, with --

8 MR. [REDACTED] Okay. When you say "Captain"  
9 I immediately thought a Coast Guard --

10 MR. FURUKAWA: (Inaudible) merchant marine -  
11 -

12 MR. [REDACTED] As far as -- I think I have  
13 already gone over this, but briefed, you know, briefed  
14 my SMC on the case, on the situation, everything, you  
15 know, we had.

16 I was attempting to contact the vessel  
17 directly via satellite phone. I made contact with the  
18 Emerald Express and I tried to launch the forward  
19 deployed MH-60 out of Great Inagua.

20 Also, I was looking at planning for surface  
21 assets and what would be available the soonest as far  
22 as a Coast Guard cutter. Because we were dealing with  
23 a foreign country we don't have any stations, you know,  
24 that would be able to provide assistance so I'd have to  
25 utilize a Coast Guard cutter to go over there.

1 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. Who else assisted with  
2 the immediate steps that were taken following the  
3 conversation with Mr. Lawrence?

4 MR. [REDACTED] So because we could not  
5 launch the MH-60 my SMC directed us to get in touch  
6 with the hurricane hunter flights that were out there  
7 tracking, and these were Air Force flights with NOAA  
8 onboard tracking the status of the hurricane, and see  
9 if we could possibly use them for assistance and maybe  
10 they would be able to, you know, attempt to establish  
11 communications or see anything.

12 And we ended up getting in contact with them  
13 and they did. However, they didn't go lower than, I  
14 think it was 10,000 feet is what they were flying at  
15 because they had to stay above the hurricane.

16 MR. WEBB: This is Paul Webb. Did the  
17 hurricane hunters have a surface search radar  
18 capability?

19 MR. [REDACTED] I don't know. And, also, I  
20 don't know how effective it would have been because  
21 they were over top of a hurricane.

22 MR. WEBB: Who would we talk to to find out  
23 on that, any idea?

24 MR. [REDACTED] I believe they were out of,  
25 that particular unit was out of, it was an Air Force



1 unit out of Pascagoula, Mississippi, that was flying on  
2 the initial -- I don't know the squadron name though,  
3 sorry.

4 MR. WEBB: And who do you call for a request  
5 like that, who did you guys call?

6 MR. [REDACTED] So I didn't make that call,  
7 Chief Webb actually made that call. I believe he  
8 called the base directly.

9 MR. BRYSON: This is Dennis Bryson. Since  
10 this was in a foreign country, the Bahamas, would the  
11 Coast Guard contact the Bahamian Coast Guard or  
12 anything?

13 MR. [REDACTED] So we did. The person in  
14 charge of search and rescue response in the Bahamas is  
15 called the Royal Bahamian Defense Force and, again,  
16 going back to my previous statement with OPBAT, OPBAT,  
17 you know, is our in-country hub and they work closely  
18 with the Royal Bahamian Defense Force and they made  
19 those notifications.

20  
21 Unfortunately, the Bahamas was unable to  
22 provide any type of assistance. They had sent all  
23 their boats to Key West for hurricane avoidance.

24 I don't know what year it's dated, but it's  
25 called the Grey Agreement and it gives us search and

1 rescue authority and ability within the Bahamas, the  
2 U.S. Coast Guard.

3 MR. FURUKAWA: They Grey Agreement?

4 MR. [REDACTED] The Grey Agreement.

5 MR. [REDACTED] Is that G-R-A-Y?

6 MR. [REDACTED] It's G-R-E-Y.

7 MR. WEBB: Do you know if that's an MOU or a  
8 treaty?

9 MR. [REDACTED] I don't know.

10 MR. WEBB: All right.

11 MR. [REDACTED] I don't believe it's an MOU,  
12 I believe it was higher level.

13 MR. [REDACTED] Do you have to get clearance  
14 with the Bahamian government prior to conducting SAROPS  
15 in their water?

16 MR. [REDACTED] It's our local policy that we  
17 should, but, no, we don't have to.

18 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. Commander, we'll be  
19 asking for a copy of that. I got it down.

20 MR. [REDACTED] Okay.

21 MR. BRYSON: Petty Officer [REDACTED] you  
22 said earlier you asked the Emerald Express to call you  
23 back if they were able to establish contact, did they  
24 ever call you back?

25 MR. [REDACTED] No, they did not.

1 MR. BRYSON: They didn't even call you back  
2 to let you know that they weren't able to contact the  
3 El Faro?

4 MR. [REDACTED] No, they did not.

5 MR. BRYSON: Okay.

6 MR. WEBB: This is Paul Webb. Were you able  
7 to issue UMIBs?

8 MR. [REDACTED] We issued an EGC, Enhanced  
9 Group Calling. It's just like a UMIB. EGC is Enhanced  
10 Group Calling, UMIB is Urgent Marine Information  
11 Broadcast.

12 The UMIBs are generally issued by the  
13 sectors who have VHF-FM capabilities through the Rescue  
14 21 System and the EGCs are for farther offshore, longer  
15 range.

16 Mr. Webb was speaking to the sea areas  
17 earlier, if we were talking Sea Area 3 or 4 we would  
18 need an enhanced group calling.

19 We also would need an enhanced group calling  
20 because we were dealing with a foreign even though we  
21 were so close to shore, we were within 36 miles of an  
22 island in the Bahamas, but it would still require an  
23 EGC because of the distance from us.

24 We can't call out to the local Bahamian  
25 authorities and tell them to issue a UMIB.

1 MR. WEBB: Have you ever requested local  
2 authorities issue emergency --

3 MR. [REDACTED] Yes. Yes, where they have  
4 radio stations. There is very few that I am aware of  
5 in the Bahamas with VHF capability.

6 We also did a, it's called Waterways Net,  
7 it's a volunteer organization over in the Bahamas, and  
8 they work closely with BASRA, which is Bahamas Air and  
9 Sea Rescue Association, and they issued basically a  
10 UMIB over HF.

11 MR. WEBB: Okay. Speaking of HF --

12 MR. [REDACTED] Yes?

13 MR. WEBB: -- through ComCom did they do  
14 voice broadcasts?

15 MR. [REDACTED] Does ComCom do voice  
16 broadcasts, I don't know. But we never directed them  
17 to for this particular case because we had the EGC and  
18 also because we had the Waterways Net broadcast going  
19 out locally in the Bahamas.

20 MR. WEBB: Okay. I understand that there  
21 was a second EPIRB that was activated somewhere in the  
22 vicinity of this, can you tell me about that?

23 MR. [REDACTED] All I know about the second  
24 EPIRB activation is that it was an EPIRB, it did  
25 provide a position, it was very close to shore, but it

1 was completely unregistered.

2 As you see on that SARSAT datasheet it's  
3 properly registered, it has the company name, it has  
4 contact information, and it's attached to a vessel. An  
5 unregistered EPIRB has none of that.

6 It just has a position and then it says  
7 "information not available at USMCC database." With no  
8 previous history, no -- That's all we had, was that  
9 there was a distress alert and a position.

10 MR. WEBB: What actions were taken on that  
11 one?

12 MR. [REDACTED] So I'm trying to remember. I  
13 don't know that we took any further actions on that one  
14 because we could not confirm nor deny if that beacon  
15 was from this ship or not until we had somebody  
16 actually arrive on scene and determine.

17 MR. WEBB: How close was it to the position  
18 of the Inmarsat C?

19 MR. [REDACTED] I would have to look. I  
20 don't know how.

21 MR. WEBB: And eventually it was determined  
22 that it was not associated with it?

23 MR. [REDACTED] Correct.

24 MR. WEBB: And how was that determined?

25 MR. [REDACTED] I wasn't on watch that day,

1 so I don't know who you would have to talk to, but  
2 generally --

3 MR. WEBB: Was it the --

4 MR. [REDACTED] Can I speak generally on  
5 this?

6 MR. WEBB: Sure.

7 MR. [REDACTED] We would fly a helicopter  
8 over top of it and find out if --

9 MR. WEBB: Did it remain active through --  
10 You got the --

11 MR. [REDACTED] It did.

12 (Simultaneous speaking)

13 MR. [REDACTED] It remained active for some  
14 time.

15 MR. WEBB: And so they had that sitting  
16 there and --

17 MR. [REDACTED] And, again, right near shore.

18 MR. WEBB: Right near shore.

19 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: This is Patty  
20 Finsterbusch from TOTE Services. We only had one EPIRB  
21 onboard and that question was asked at some point.

22 MR. WEBB: Right.

23 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

24 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: And we confirmed that we  
25 just had the one.

1 MR. [REDACTED] And that's, you know, again,  
2 we were trying to confirm all that.

3 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: When you got on duty that  
4 morning --

5 MR. [REDACTED] Yes?

6 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: -- so you got there at  
7 5:30, but at 6 o'clock you would've had the turnover.  
8 The hurricane was the big news at that point?

9 MR. [REDACTED] I'd say so. The hurricane  
10 plus the active search and rescue cases that we had.  
11 But, I mean, you say "big news," we do turnover, you  
12 know, the same everyday.

13 We go through everything, all the active  
14 search and rescue cases, all the law enforcement cases,  
15 we go through the weather, the blue force is  
16 (inaudible), where all of our assets are in case we  
17 need them to respond to any type of situation, whether  
18 LE or search and rescue, and our chain of command who  
19 is on duty for what position. It's done the same way.

20 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: The storm was, I mean  
21 Joaquin started off as kind of a strange storm anyway,  
22 but your assets, you moved your assets south.

23 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

24 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: So you --

25 MR. [REDACTED] I didn't specifically, but --

1 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: Well, no, the Coast Guard  
2 moved their assets south to, I would assume, from where  
3 things were available later on.

4 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

5 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: Do you guys look at the  
6 AIS to see that there was a ship heading straight to  
7 the --

8 MR. [REDACTED] No, we don't generally  
9 monitor that. As far as, you know, monitoring AIS to  
10 see if a vessel is heading into a storm in a foreign  
11 country --

12 MR. WEBB: Is that a VTS question?

13 MR. [REDACTED] I mean it would be if we were  
14 talking, you know, the United States. Yes, I mean we  
15 would monitor that.

16 I mean we have, like I said before, a CG-1  
17 view up on watch, but I don't know that it would be  
18 anybody's specific tasking or specific job requirement  
19 to monitor that.

20 MR. [REDACTED] Is there any objection with this  
21 safety group that I am interjecting with questions at  
22 all?

23 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: No.

24 MR. FURUKAWA: Well as an attorney, but you  
25 are also a marine safety officer?



1 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

2 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. I'll allow it as a,  
3 since you are a marine safety to bring that expertise.

4 MR. [REDACTED] I am just offering that just to  
5 help clarify some of his answers, so I just don't want  
6 anything taken out of context for, really for his  
7 benefit.

8 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: The reason I asked the  
9 question was only because of something that was said in  
10 an earlier interview and I was a little, I was just  
11 surprised that they would send out a C-130 making these  
12 blind announcements to mariners.

13 I sailed for five years, I never heard of  
14 that and I just was like did you, was someone  
15 monitoring different ships, I'm going to send out a C-  
16 130 to make the announcement that yes, hey, you're  
17 going into a storm.

18 I mean mariners follow the weather. I would  
19 just have -- It just seems strange to me. But I want  
20 to go back to -- So that morning, so, what, it takes  
21 about 45 minutes for the turnover, in that time period?

22 MR. [REDACTED] Sure, give or take, yes.

23 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: Okay. So then this  
24 started pretty quick right after --

25 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

1 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: Yes, okay. And I know  
2 that, but I can't remember exactly when, there was  
3 another vessel in distress, was that after that? There  
4 was one where the helicopters went out and they --

5 MR. [REDACTED] Yes, I was involved on that  
6 case as well. Is that specific case going to be  
7 specific to this?

8 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: At the timing --

9 MR. [REDACTED] Okay.

10 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: -- and I'm trying to find  
11 my notes --

12 MR. [REDACTED] Sure.

13 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: -- but the timing was a  
14 little --

15 MR. [REDACTED] Sure, I'll talk to it. It  
16 was the next night and I was coming back on that  
17 morning. It was a, I believe it was a Polish-flagged  
18 commercial ship, 200 and some odd feet in length that  
19 we rescued 12 people off of.

20 The vessel completely sank. They went into  
21 the water on a life raft and we rescued the 12 to Great  
22 Inagua. That was the same Air Clearwater Forward  
23 Deployed MH-60 that effected that rescue. However,  
24 this was about 150 miles south.

25 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: And the storm had passed

1 by that time so you were able to track that?

2 MR. [REDACTED] This was very far south of  
3 the storm and I believe the sea conditions were still  
4 not very conducive.

5 I know on that case the cutter couldn't even  
6 get close enough to the life raft to get the people off  
7 of that because they were reporting 11 to 12-foot seas.

8 So the helicopter actually had to go back,  
9 refuel, and go back and rescue the final three on that  
10 particular case.

11 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: Okay.

12 MR. [REDACTED] That was the next morning.

13 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: Okay.

14 MR. [REDACTED] Yes. And it was still, still  
15 the conditions that day were still --

16 MR. WEBB: Do you remember what the weather  
17 was, close to it, you said ten to 12-foot?

18 MR. [REDACTED] That was for the Minouche  
19 case, correct.

20 MR. WEBB: Yes, right.

21 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

22 MR. WEBB: That's what I'm talking about.

23 MR. [REDACTED] Just off of memory I believe  
24 it was ten to 12-foot seas.

25 MR. WEBB: What about winds on that one?

1 MR. [REDACTED] I don't remember. I'm sure I  
2 could look it up. If it's pertinent to this I can get  
3 it for you if you need it, but just off the top of my  
4 head I don't remember.

5 MR. FURUKAWA: John Furukawa with the NTSB.  
6 The name of the vessel that sunk was the Minouche?

7 MR. [REDACTED] The Minouche.

8 MR. FURUKAWA: Paul, do you want to get into  
9 the phases that you were going to --

10 MR. WEBB: What I'm trying to do as I'm  
11 talking about this use an AIAPOC model and --

12 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

13 MR. WEBB: -- that we try to not jump around  
14 too far ahead. So far we've been keeping to that, so  
15 it's been pretty good, initial actions --

16 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

17 MR. FURUKAWA: And do you want to say for  
18 the record what the acronym AIAPOC stands for?

19 MR. WEBB: Sure. It's Alert Initial Action  
20 Planning, Operations, and Conclusions. It's just a  
21 method the Coast Guard has in the Coast Guard addendum  
22 to help the SAR controllers put a case in order to make  
23 sure they don't miss things. Something you learn in  
24 SAR school.

25 So really we are starting to get into

1 planning, all the things talked about so far, initial  
2 actions, can you think of any other initial actions  
3 that maybe you took that is -- You kind of hit almost  
4 everything I had written down here.

5 MR. [REDACTED] No. I do recall calling Air  
6 Station Clearwater as well to see if we could get a C-  
7 130 even in close.

8 MR. WEBB: And what did they say?

9 MR. [REDACTED] That was a negative as well.  
10 And it's in MSL as well, but I believe the first and  
11 the second day we couldn't get within 100 plus miles,  
12 I'll say that.

13 MR. WEBB: And there were attempts to?

14 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

15 MALE PARTICIPANT: The C-130's couldn't get  
16 within 100 miles.

17 MR. WEBB: Okay. So you've done all your  
18 initial actions and you're starting to go into  
19 planning, did you open up MSL, or not --

20 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

21 MR. WEBB: -- MSL, but SAROPS and start  
22 initial drift of, that you had off the --

23 MR. [REDACTED] Yes. I did an LKP scenario  
24 for this particular event because we had a very good,  
25 probably better than, you know, any search and rescue

1 case, we had a very good last known position because we  
2 had the AIS data and we the Inmarsat C distress alert  
3 and those correlated with each other.

4 So we had a very good last known position of  
5 the vessel.

6 MR. [REDACTED] LKP is?

7 MR. [REDACTED] Last known position, LKP.

8 MR. WEBB: Okay. So how long did you drift  
9 it for?

10 MR. [REDACTED] I don't recall how long I  
11 drifted it for. I know when I opened the case and  
12 briefed SMC and we, you know, by this point we were  
13 fully aware that we were unable to launch.

14 I don't remember how long I drifted it for.  
15 Generally in our training we are told to drift it until  
16 the first asset arrives on scene, but that was unknown.

17 MR. WEBB: What directions did you give the  
18 hurricane hunters for what you wanted them to do search  
19 wise?

20 MR. [REDACTED] Well the hurricane hunters  
21 were on another mission, so, you know, we couldn't  
22 direct them really to do anything because they were on  
23 another mission.

24 However, we asked them to do call outs for  
25 the motor vessel El Faro and to, you know, if they

1 could locate visually then to, you know, report  
2 findings back. However, we knew that they were on  
3 another mission and we knew that they were flying above  
4 the hurricane.

5 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: This is Patty  
6 Finsterbusch. And this is just an additional point,  
7 twice I've heard everyone refer to the El Faro as an MV  
8 and it's an SS. In your mind would it make a  
9 difference to you if it's an MV or an SS?

10 MR. WEBB: No.

11 MR. [REDACTED] Not at all.

12 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: If they said loss of  
13 power?

14 MR. [REDACTED] Not at all.

15 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: Okay. For an engineer,  
16 yes, it does. I mean a steam plant and a diesel engine  
17 are completely different.

18 MR. WEBB: For --

19 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: Okay.

20 MR. WEBB: For the OS we're all in the  
21 Command Center, we're all --

22 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: All right.

23 MR. [REDACTED] No.

24 MR. WEBB: It just doesn't.

25 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

1 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: And then again, were you  
2 guys under the impression of loss of propulsion, loss  
3 of power, two different -- Yes.

4 MR. [REDACTED] Both. It's two separate  
5 things.

6 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: Yes.

7 MR. [REDACTED] Two totally different things,  
8 yes.

9 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: But which one did you  
10 believe the ship had, was it both?

11 MR. [REDACTED] Both.

12 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: Both, all right.

13 MR. [REDACTED] Based on the information that  
14 we got in the email.

15 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: Okay. And from John  
16 Lawrence you don't remember exactly what he said, but  
17 we could --

18 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

19 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: All right. Because we  
20 were going with loss of propulsion.

21 MR. [REDACTED] That would be, the more  
22 dangerous thing would be losing propulsion than losing  
23 power, but, yes, we were under the impression that they  
24 had lost both.

25 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: Everything, okay.



1 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

2 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: That's all.

3 MR. [REDACTED] And we had no direct  
4 communications, you know, with the vessel.

5 MR. FURUKAWA: This is John Furukawa with  
6 the NTSB. Going along with what Patty just said, was  
7 this a disabled vessel or was it an emergency, because  
8 we had heard something earlier that --

9 MR. WEBB: He said it was in distress phase.

10 MR. FURUKAWA: Was it distress or --

11 MR. [REDACTED] This was a disabled vessel.  
12 This also was an emergency.

13 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay.

14 MR. [REDACTED] This was absolutely an  
15 emergency. You had a disabled vessel in a hurricane.

16 MR. WEBB: This is Paul Webb. The emergency  
17 phases that the Coast Guard uses is uncertainty, alert,  
18 and distress. They all have different meanings and you  
19 can be, if you just an uncorrelated Mayday or something  
20 like that you may be in an uncertainty phase or a white  
21 flare would be uncertainty.

22 Alert would be somebody saying hey, I'm  
23 disabled, I think I can anchor out, but I may need some  
24 help, and they might put you into an alert stage that  
25 you need to go and to, you know, go get them at some

1 point.

2 Distress, as soon as you get any of the  
3 beacon alerts, the Inmarsat C, SASS would put you into  
4 distress immediately and respond that way. That's  
5 Coast Guard standard everywhere.

6 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. So the El Faro was it  
7 always in a distress phase, was it in alert or  
8 uncertainty?

9 MR. [REDACTED] We were initially in the  
10 alert phase and then we quickly shifted to the distress  
11 phase because we did not establish any type of  
12 communications.

13 And the only reason we were in the alert  
14 phase was until we got a clearer picture of what actual  
15 weather they were experiencing and also while we were  
16 still trying to establish communications.

17 But that very quickly shifted to the  
18 distress phase and that's why we were trying to launch,  
19 you know, get immediate launch of aircraft.

20 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. So about how long was  
21 it in the alert phase and it went to the distress  
22 phase, minutes, seconds?

23 MR. [REDACTED] I don't know how long, but it  
24 was very quickly where we shifted because of all the  
25 factors, because of the weather, because we still had

1 not been able to get communications with the vessel,  
2 you know, even after having a ship, another ship that  
3 was close by try and call out.

4 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. And who can elevate it  
5 from an alert to a distress?

6 MR. [REDACTED] Anybody.

7 MR. FURUKAWA: Anybody can?

8 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

9 MR. FURUKAWA: So you --

10 MR. [REDACTED] I briefed Captain Coggeshall  
11 (phonetic).

12 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. When you briefed him  
13 was it still in alert phase or was it already in  
14 distress?

15 MR. [REDACTED] I briefed him several times  
16 in everything.

17 MR. FURUKAWA: The first time when you  
18 briefed him -- He's the SMC, right?

19 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

20 MR. FURUKAWA: That was you said minutes  
21 after you first got the call?

22 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

23 MR. FURUKAWA: Was it still an alert or had  
24 it gone to distress?

25 MR. [REDACTED] Once we got the beacon alert

1 and I re-briefed him after that we were in the distress  
2 phase.

3 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. And that beacon is the

4 --

5 MR. [REDACTED] The EPIRB, the unlocated.

6 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay.

7 MR. BRYSON: You don't recall what time you  
8 get this, right?

9 MR. [REDACTED] It's time stamped.

10 MR. BRYSON: Yes, it's time stamped on here,  
11 so I mean you get this as soon as it goes, right, so  
12 this was --

13 MR. [REDACTED] That's when we received it.

14 MR. BRYSON: So it looks like 7:36.

15 MALE PARTICIPANT: 7:36 it came in.

16 MR. [REDACTED] Yes. Thirty-nine. So 11:39  
17 Zulu (phonetic) or a coordinated universal time.

18 MR. BRYSON: So that, yes, that was pretty  
19 soon after they make this call.

20 MR. [REDACTED] Pretty quick.

21 MR. [REDACTED] This is Commander [REDACTED] Does  
22 getting that EPIRB, a notice when you did, elevate or  
23 exacerbate the status of how you handle it as a  
24 distress or otherwise?

25 MR. [REDACTED] I think every case is

1 different, you know. It's hard to say, you know, if  
2 this then this. I think every case is different and  
3 every case evolves differently, you know.

4 All I can speak to is that's the initial  
5 information that we got via the email from LANTAREA.  
6 You know, I briefed it up with what we had and we went  
7 from there.

8 We were in the distress phase, you know, I  
9 talked to Captain Coggeshall and it was decided that  
10 the only thing, you know, the only response that we  
11 could take, utilizing proper operational risk  
12 management was sending the hurricane hunters out there  
13 because it was too dangerous to send in Coast Guard  
14 aircraft crews.

15 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. John Furukawa. So  
16 11:36 Zulu time that you got this -- Oh, 11:39  
17 coordinated universal time. So if anything at 0739  
18 local time is (inaudible) was distressed, okay.

19 MR. WEBB: When you were doing your SAROPS  
20 what did you use as a target (inaudible)?

21 MR. [REDACTED] A 300-foot vessel.

22 MR. WEBB: Is that the only one? Did you do  
23 PIW or (inaudible)?

24 MR. [REDACTED] Initially we did the 300-foot  
25 vessel because you can't, SAROPS doesn't allow the

1 input of anything greater than 300-foot.

2 MR. WEBB: Okay. But did you put any  
3 smaller objects like the life raft or PIWs as other  
4 search objects --

5 MR. [REDACTED] I know I did later on in the  
6 case. I'm not sure if I did initially.

7 MR. WEBB: I read somewhere in the MSL, so  
8 I'm asking you know, that you contacted the Coast Guard  
9 oceanographer at some point?

10 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

11 MR. WEBB: And when did you guys do that?

12 MR. [REDACTED] Well --

13 MR. WEBB: And the Coast Guard oceanographer  
14 is, his name is Art Hanlon.

15 MR. [REDACTED] Are you talking for SAROPS  
16 support?

17 MR. WEBB: Yes.

18 MR. [REDACTED] I did not call him.

19 MR. WEBB: Okay. That happened maybe --

20 MR. [REDACTED] I think the SAR specialist  
21 called him to get some more information.

22 MR. WEBB: Okay. At some point he was  
23 though?

24 MR. [REDACTED] Yes. I didn't call him  
25 directly, no.

1 MR. WEBB: Was that during your watch or was  
2 that after?

3 MR. [REDACTED] If it was I wasn't made aware  
4 of it.

5 MR. WEBB: Okay. All right. So this first  
6 watch, the only SRUs you had available that actually  
7 were out in the area were the hurricane hunters, is  
8 that correct?

9 MR. [REDACTED] Correct.

10 MR. WEBB: Okay. So you didn't have  
11 anything else you could do besides do the broadcast and  
12 --

13 MR. [REDACTED] Correct.

14 MR. WEBB: So there were only two of the  
15 hurricane hunters that were involved or did they sent  
16 out other ones after?

17 MR. [REDACTED] I believe they sent out other  
18 ones after. I think they were flying on it the entire  
19 time.

20 MR. WEBB: Okay. So there was almost like a  
21 constant stream, when one got relieved by the next?

22 MR. [REDACTED] I think there was two a day.

23 MR. WEBB: Two a day?

24 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

25 MR. WEBB: How many hours did they fly?

1 MR. [REDACTED] I think they were up, I think  
2 they were on scene for eight hours.

3 MR. WEBB: What type of aircraft, do you  
4 know what they were?

5 MR. [REDACTED] Those are C-130s.

6 MR. WEBB: They're C-130s?

7 MR. [REDACTED] Yes. They're Air Force C-  
8 130s.

9 MR. WEBB: I'm tapped out. I don't think I  
10 have anymore questions.

11 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. For the -- Let's see.  
12 I have in Mr. Lawrence's notes that the Coast Guard  
13 Miami contacted him at 0738 and so the beacon came in I  
14 guess as you were talking to him, okay. Okay, does  
15 anybody have anything? Patty?

16 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: Patty Finsterbusch. I'm  
17 not sure if we're going to go into the next area, so  
18 basically when you got off watch that night you  
19 couldn't put any assets out, you were looking for  
20 assets to pre-position them, correct?

21 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

22 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: And you were waiting for  
23 the storm to clear?

24 MR. [REDACTED] Correct.

25 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: So when you came on --



1 You came back on duty the next morning at 0600?

2 MR. [REDACTED] Correct.

3 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: Okay. Can you tell us if  
4 anything had changed from when you left to that till  
5 you arrived?

6 MR. [REDACTED] Yes, I can. No, the  
7 hurricane was still on top and it was, looking at the  
8 weather forecast it was supposed to stay there for at  
9 least the remainder of that day.

10 Also, we were getting updates from the  
11 Hurricane Warning Center and it comes to the same email  
12 box that that does that has a graphical forecast and  
13 forecasted wind and seas for that area.

14 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: So the hurricane was  
15 staying, all the assets were pre-positioned by that  
16 time, you had pre-positioned your assets to as soon as  
17 they could go, the Coast Guard?

18 MR. [REDACTED] We had assets available for  
19 immediate launch. We just couldn't launch them due to  
20 the weather. It was out of their limitations for the  
21 helicopters.

22 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: And there was no  
23 additional information of any kind of where the ship  
24 possibly could be?

25 MR. [REDACTED] Correct.

1 MR. WEBB: This is Paul Webb. During that  
2 second watch you had there, that whole 12-hour period  
3 nothing was able to move except the hurricane hunters?

4 MR. [REDACTED] Correct.

5 MR. WEBB: And did you guys update your  
6 SAROPS? Again did you do another drift or re-drift  
7 from the beginning or how were you keeping up with that  
8 to be ready for when you could start launching?

9 MR. [REDACTED] Sure. Mr. Webb, at that  
10 point all we had was the last known position and the  
11 description of the vessel. So at that point we were  
12 still in the same position that we were in.

13 We were ready to launch, we were ready to  
14 go, we just couldn't. And then as far as the planning  
15 and, you know, actual operations go, I believe that  
16 came the next day after the storm had passed.

17 MR. WEBB: Okay. So which watch was the  
18 first watch that was able to do SAR planning with  
19 actual, with SAROPS and to issue an SAP?

20 MR. [REDACTED] That would be the third.

21 MR. WEBB: On the third?

22 MR. [REDACTED] Correct.

23 MR. WEBB: Morning watch?

24 MR. [REDACTED] I believe so, I wasn't there.

25 MR. WEBB: Was there anything significant in

1 your second watch that occurred that you know to this  
2 case information wise or anything else that came up  
3 besides maybe the publicity or anything like that, I  
4 mean actual --

5 MR. [REDACTED] Actual things that are  
6 relevant to the case, no. No, no, there wasn't. We  
7 weren't, we didn't have anything that could go in there  
8 and nobody else was going in there either.

9 MR. WEBB: Okay.

10 MR. FURUKAWA: John Furukawa, NTSB. So when  
11 this all first started you are saying that the helos  
12 couldn't get within a hundred miles and for your second  
13 watch the beginning of it was that still about the  
14 same, a hundred miles?

15 MR. [REDACTED] It was still about the same.

16 MR. FURUKAWA: And 12 hours later they had,  
17 when you were getting off watch was it still a hundred  
18 miles?

19 MR. [REDACTED] So my recollection was that  
20 the storm was moving north at two to four knots.

21 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay.

22 MR. [REDACTED] And I believe it was a 160  
23 nautical mile swath.

24 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay.

25 MR. [REDACTED] So moving that slow,

1 something that large --

2 MR. [REDACTED] Just a point of clarification,  
3 this is Commander [REDACTED] Was it the helos that  
4 couldn't get within a hundred miles or the C-130s?

5 MR. [REDACTED] It was both. There was no  
6 type of air asset that could get in there.

7 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. And the hurricane  
8 hunters were able to because they would fly over it  
9 all?

10 MR. [REDACTED] Because they are flying over.

11 MR. FURUKAWA: Yes.

12 MR. [REDACTED] Because they are flying at an  
13 altitude that's above the actual hurricane, it's not  
14 going to cause them any safety issues.

15 MR. FURUKAWA: Right, okay.

16 MR. [REDACTED] But if we were going to try  
17 and send a Coast Guard asset in we would want them  
18 obviously a lot lower so they could, you know, provide  
19 that search that we would want, so they could provide  
20 that rescuing.

21 MR. FURUKAWA: Right. You stood the 0600 to  
22 1800 watches --

23 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

24 MR. FURUKAWA: -- is your watch schedule  
25 three days in a row or how do you do it?

1 MR. [REDACTED] It's hard to say, it varies.

2 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. So on the 1st was that  
3 the -- On October 1st was that your first day of your  
4 0600 to --

5 MR. [REDACTED] Correct.

6 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. So you did three in a  
7 row?

8 MR. [REDACTED] I did two in a row.

9 MR. FURUKAWA: Two in a row, okay.

10 MR. [REDACTED] Our general, speaking in  
11 generalities, our general watch schedule is two days on  
12 three days off.

13 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay.

14 MR. [REDACTED] But based on the needs and  
15 based on what's going on that's always subject to  
16 change.

17 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. So the 1st and 2nd  
18 were your two days on, did you come back for more work,  
19 more watches, on your three days off?

20 MR. [REDACTED] I came in for a few hours on  
21 Saturday to close out some cases that I had, including  
22 the Minouche case that I had told you about, and just  
23 administrative paperwork, and that's it.

24 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. Anybody else? Paul?

25 MR. WEBB: I think I'm done.

1 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay.

2 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: So when you left the  
3 second day that was basically the end of your  
4 interaction with the El Faro (inaudible)?

5 MR. [REDACTED] Until I came back on?

6 MR. FURUKAWA: Which was? Do you know what  
7 day?

8 MALE PARTICIPANT: That would be the 6th?

9 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: Sixth?

10 MR. [REDACTED] I don't know. Yes, I don't  
11 recall right now. I think it was Monday because I got  
12 -- Yes, I think I came back on Monday. I think I only  
13 had two days off.

14 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay.

15 MR. [REDACTED] I'd have to look at the  
16 schedule because I know the schedule changed for this.

17 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. And do you remember  
18 your watch on Monday? Did you have the 1800 to 0600 or  
19 did you have the 0600 to --

20 MR. [REDACTED] No. So, John, the way it  
21 works is you work that same shift for a month and then  
22 it'll go to the other shift for a month.

23 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. Okay, so Monday you  
24 had the 0600 to 1800?

25 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

1 MR. FURUKAWA: Do you remember what was  
2 happening on that watch?

3 MR. [REDACTED] We were actively searching by  
4 the time that I got back on watch with -- When I came  
5 back on watch it had become a large scale search and  
6 rescue operation and we were actively flying with DoD  
7 aircraft along with Coast Guard aircraft and had, I  
8 believe, three Coast Guard cutters on scene, the  
9 Sexton, Reliance, and the Northland.

10 We also had several sorties with multiple  
11 aircraft all flying at the same time. Those aircraft  
12 included Air Force C-130s, Navy P-8s, MH-60s out of GI,  
13 Coast Guard C-130s, Coast Guard 144s out of Miami.

14 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay.

15 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: Patty Finsterbusch from  
16 TOTE Services. Were you still looking for a ship at  
17 that time or were you --

18 MR. [REDACTED] No.

19 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: So it was --

20 MR. [REDACTED] No.

21 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: -- PIWs and lifeboats,  
22 life rafts?

23 MR. [REDACTED] Correct.

24 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: Do you know when the  
25 Coast Guard no longer was searching for a ship?

1 MR. [REDACTED] Are you looking for like a  
2 specific time or -- Because I don't know. The best  
3 person to ask that would be Captain Coggeshall when you  
4 interview him.

5 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: I'll ask him.

6 MR. [REDACTED] Because it's, you know,  
7 Patty, that's completely his call.

8 MR. FURUKAWA: Anything else?

9 MR. WEBB: SMC didn't change throughout the  
10 whole thing it stayed --

11 MR. [REDACTED] It did not.

12 MR. WEBB: -- with the Captain, right?

13 MR. [REDACTED] Correct.

14 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: And is that normal that  
15 he would just --

16 MR. WEBB: Yes.

17 MS. FINSTERBUSCH: -- he would handle the  
18 whole situation?

19 MR. [REDACTED] He should, yes.

20 MR. WEBB: Yes. You don't want to shift  
21 that (inaudible).

22 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. So are we about ready  
23 to --

24 MR. WEBB: Pardon me?

25 MR. FURUKAWA: Are we about ready to end



1 this?

2 MR. WEBB: I think we are.

3 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. [REDACTED] let's see, as  
4 we're ending this, is there anything you'd like to add  
5 or change?

6 MR. [REDACTED] Nothing I can think of at  
7 this time, no.

8 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. Are there any  
9 questions we should've asked you but did not?

10 MR. [REDACTED] I can't think of anything  
11 right now, no.

12 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. So as it pertains to  
13 the sinking of the El Faro do you have any suggestions  
14 for preventing a reoccurrence of the loss of the El  
15 Faro?

16 MR. [REDACTED] No.

17 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. And is there anybody  
18 else that we should interview?

19 MR. [REDACTED] I think you should interview  
20 -- I don't know, who are you interviewing?

21 MR. FURUKAWA: The watchstanders here and I  
22 guess we're going to want to interview Lieutenant  
23 Commander [REDACTED] probably from LANT.

24 MR. [REDACTED] Okay.

25 MR. FURUKAWA: (Inaudible) --

1 MR. [REDACTED] Which watchstanders here, all  
2 of them?

3 MR. FURUKAWA: Um --

4 MR. WEBB: No, actually we're, what I  
5 requested and I'm wondering a bit that now myself,  
6 originally it was the first two watches, thinking that  
7 the second watch was going to be well into the  
8 planning.

9 MR. [REDACTED] No.

10 MR. WEBB: So we're basically into the third  
11 day before we got the alpha search.

12 MR. [REDACTED] Lieutenant [REDACTED] (phonetic) is  
13 that third --

14 MR. [REDACTED] He's here. He was the CDO.

15 MR. WEBB: So [REDACTED] is our next person we're  
16 going to talk to.

17 MR. FURUKAWA: Because you guys are off duty  
18 right now, right, with your 12 on 12 off.

19 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

20 MR. WEBB: So (inaudible) --

21 MR. [REDACTED] Do you have Petty Officer  
22 [REDACTED] on your list?

23 MR. WEBB: I don't know if he is on there.

24 MR. [REDACTED] This is Commander [REDACTED] He was  
25 not on the original list.

1 MR. WEBB: I think he should be, I caught  
2 that earlier and I made a note.

3 MR. [REDACTED] Right. I think he should be  
4 added on the list. He did some search planning  
5 overnight and, you know, compiled those --

6 MR. WEBB: The first alpha search?

7 MR. [REDACTED] No, but later on. Because I  
8 think he was, he was on the same schedule as me.

9 MR. WEBB: So he relieved you or you --

10 MR. [REDACTED] Yes. So he relieved me and  
11 then I believe we both had two days off and then I  
12 believe we came back, both of us, for the next three  
13 days.

14 MR. WEBB: Okay. How about the opposite  
15 watch for the third? So you guys are kind of, he was  
16 night, too?

17 MR. [REDACTED] I was days, he was nights.

18 MR. WEBB: Okay. Who was the night/days on  
19 the next set, and would they have gone into Day 3?

20 MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

21 MR. WEBB: Okay. That group of people --

22 MR. [REDACTED] That as Day 3 and 4.

23 MR. WEBB: -- that watch section, night and  
24 day, whoever was on there, CDO, OU, confirm who those  
25 guys are and how we can talk to them.

1 MR. [REDACTED] Okay.

2 MR. WEBB: We'll be here for another month.

3 MR. FURUKAWA: And you have my card and all  
4 that.

5 MR. [REDACTED] Sure.

6 MR. FURUKAWA: It is now -- You all ready?

7 MR. WEBB: Yes.

8 MR. FURUKAWA: Okay. It's 1342 and we are  
9 ending the interview with OS2 [REDACTED]

10 -END OF FILE-

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